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The social problem of poverty can be mitigated by introduction of a personal tax-free 
allowance. In this paper the likely effects that a personal tax-free allowance will have 
on the Russian budget is investigated. It has been assumed that a tax-free allowance 
will hit regional budgets because they depend greatly on income tax revenue. The 
indicated effects were estimated by applying a personal tax-free allowance to the 
data on economic conditions in 2019. Rosstat data on population, poverty, wages and 
gross regional product and Federal Tax Service data on the number of taxpayers and 
personal income tax revenues were used. For the purpose of the paper, two scenarios 
were calculated. In the first scenario, a zero personal income tax rate is applied to 
wages below the minimum cost of living. We found that under this scenario the 
consolidated budget of Russia loses over 1 trillion rubles while regional tax revenues 
reduce by more than 10%. In the second scenario, citizens whose income is below 
the minimum cost of living are exempt from personal income tax. We found that 
under this scenario regional tax revenues would be reduced by 1-5%. In both cases 
the introduction of the personal tax-free allowance puts greater pressure on regions 
that critically depend on the personal income tax receipts. It was concluded that the 
negative effect of an introduction of a personal tax-free allowance would be greater, 
the greater the prevalence of low-income taxpayers in a region. Also considerable 
regional disparities create a risk that such tax reform will deepen regional inequality 
and be disruptive for the Russian budgetary system. 
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Социальную проблему бедности может смягчить введение необлагаемого подо-
ходным налогом минимума доходов граждан. В статье исследуются вероятные 
бюджетные потери от введения в России необлагаемого подоходным налогом 
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минимума доходов граждан. Выдвигается гипотеза, что введение необлагаемо-
го минимума негативно скажется на регионах, поскольку зависимость их бюд-
жетов от поступления подоходного налога велика. Расчет последствий введе-
ния необлагаемого минимума проводился для экономических условий 2019 г. 
Источником данных являлись данные Росстата о населении, бедности, заработ-
ной плате и валовом региональном продукте, а также данные Федеральной на-
логовой службы о количестве налогоплательщиков и налоговых поступлениях. 
Для целей исследования были рассчитаны два сценария. По первому сценарию 
к заработной плате ниже прожиточного минимума применяется нулевая став-
ка налога на доходы физических лиц. Мы обнаружили, что при этом сцена-
рии консолидированный бюджет России теряет более 1 трлн р., в то время как 
налоговые поступления в региональные бюджеты сокращаются более чем на 
10%. По второму сценарию не облагаются налогом на доходы физических лиц 
граждане, чей доход ниже прожиточного минимума. Данные, полученные по 
второму сценарию, показывают, что региональные налоговые поступления со-
кратятся на 1–5%. В любом случае, введение необлагаемого налогом минимума 
оказывает более сильное давление на те регионы, которые критически зависят 
от поступлений подоходного налога с физических лиц. Можно сделать вывод, 
что введение льготы при преобладании налогоплательщиков с низкими дохо-
дами приведет к существенным потерям для региональных бюджетов. Сделан 
вывод, что негативное влияние введения необлагаемого минимума будет тем 
больше, чем больше в регионе преобладают малообеспеченные налогоплатель-
щики. Кроме того, значительные региональные диспропорции создают риск 
того, что такая налоговая реформа усугубит региональное неравенство и подо-
рвет бюджетную систему России.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
налоговая реформа, налоговый вычет, необлагаемый минимум, подоходный 
налог, прогрессивная шкала
1. Introduction
Flat personal income tax rate was 
adopted in Russia in 2001. This step was 
aimed at legalizing individual incomes 
and expanding the tax base in economy. 
Since then, the design of the Russian per-
sonal income tax has hinged upon the 
concept of budget efficiency of taxation. 
In accordance with this concept, the stan-
dard tax deduction of 400 roubles was 
cancelled in 2012. At the same time the 
absence of a tax-free allowance is still a 
much discussed question in Russia for the 
following reasons: 
1. The tax burden is not lowered for 
disadvantaged groups. There is neither 
reduced tax rate nor tax exemption for 
low incomes. Even the subsistence mini-
mum is fully taxed. For poor people, this 
burden is much heavier than for wealthier 
taxpayers because the lower is the income, 
the higher is the share of expenditures on 
basic necessities. Thus, the tax fairness is 
not observed.
2. According to the Federal State Sta-
tistics Service (Rosstat), in 2019 the share 
of poor people in Russia was 12.3% or 
18.1 million. In these conditions, the ab-
sence of a personal tax-free allowance 
exacerbates the problem of poverty. Al-
though the personal income tax design is 
not the ultimate solution to the problem 
of poverty, it can help narrow the gap be-
tween the rich and the poor.
3. The connection between the sim-
plicity of the personal income tax’s cal-
culation and its collectability is far from 
being obvious. Economists cannot agree 
even regarding the success of the tax re-
form of 2001: some consider it to be a di-
rect outcome of the transition to the flat 
tax rate [1], others point out that these 
results were achieved due to the overall 
individual income growth in Russia and 
reduction of social security contribution 
rates [2].
4. The rules of personal income taxa-
tion do not fit into the global trends. Tax 
systems of all developed countries with 
the largest economies in the world, in-
cluding the USA, UK, Japan, Germany 
and Canada, have a personal allowance.
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5. No inflation-related indexation of 
the existing tax deductions has been made 
and the transition to progressive taxation 
since 2021 is unlikely to bring any dra-
matic improvements to the lives of people 
from disadvantaged groups. The extra tax 
rate of 15% is aimed at enhancing income 
tax collection. 
In Russia, where poverty is a serious 
social problem, the design of personal in-
come tax has been a subject of consi-derable 
debate and no finality has been achieved 
up to date. The tax system is now ente- 
ring a new stage in its development, which 
makes our study particularly relevant. The 
Russian government’s decision to abol-
ish the flat tax rate shows the willingness 
to apply more complex models of income 
taxation. And we’re at a fork in the road. 
On one hand, the fiscal success Russia has 
enjoyed in recent years signifies the effi-
ciency of its current taxation pattern and 
relevance to support it. On the other hand, 
taxpayers’ abili-ty to pay the personal in-
come tax is taken into account only in deal-
ing with high incomes while low income, 
as before, is considered of little importance 
in determining the degree of tax immunity. 
In the light of the above, it is obvious 
that there is a need for such tax mecha-
nism for income redistribution and ine-
quality reduction as a personal tax-free 
allowance. This, in turn, raises a question 
as to how such reform will influence the 
Russian budget system. 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the 
possible budget implications of the intro-
duction of a personal tax-free allowance 
by taking into account the Russian federa-
tive structure. Therefore, we are going to 
look at the reform’s effect on the consoli-
dated budget of Russia and the budgets of 
regional governments.
We are going to test the hypothesis 
that there is a connection between the 
amount of tax revenue losses of regional 
governments and these regions’ reliance 
on the personal income tax for their tax 
revenues. We suppose that the regions 
that are going to be hit the hardest by the 
reform are most likely to be those with a 
high share of the personal income tax in 
the structure of their tax revenues.
The article is structured as follows. 
Section 2 provides an overview of the rel-
evant research literature on the problem; 
Section 3 describes the data and meth-
odology of the study; Section 4 discusses 
the results; and Section 5 summarizes our 
findings.
2. Literature review
In research literature, tax-free allo-
wance is usually seen as one of the key 
elements of progressive income taxation, 
while the latter is compared to flat income 
taxation to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of these taxation types. The 
choice of a tax scale is widely discussed in 
connection to fairness of taxation. 
J. Head et al. contend that the selec-
tion of criteria of fairness in dealing with 
horizontal-equity (individuals with simi-
lar incomes) issues of taxation are related 
to the choice of income, consumption, 
or wealth as the tax base while vertical- 
equity issues (individuals with different 
incomes) are related to the choice of flat or 
more progressive rate structures [3]. 
D. Roberts and M. Sullivan observe 
that the classical argument given by the 
proponents of the flat scale is that the 
amount to be paid is differentiated regard-
less of the single tax rate as wealthier indi-
viduals are bound to pay more [4]. Such 
approach, however, ignores the distribu-
tion of the tax burden among individu-
als. B. Adhikari and J. Alm, for example, 
argue that the share of consumption ex-
penditures is larger for the poor, which 
is why the real tax burden is higher for 
low-income households [5].
As a part of the progressive scale, 
tax-free allowance may be represented in 
the form of a zero tax rate. But the theory 
of taxation has described mechanisms to 
achieve progressivity even under the flat 
rate tax by using some other tax elements 
than the tax rate itself. In this context, 
tax-free allowance is seen as similar to 
the personal exemption or tax deduction. 
J. McNulty demonstrates that if the struc-
ture of a flat income tax includes personal 
tax exemptions, such tax is actually pro-
gressive even though officially it may be 
flat [6]. 
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G. Nicodème argues that tax progres-
sivity is primarily provided by the design 
of the tax, not by the transition to the 
progressive scale as such. The tax design 
is based on the combination of the mar-
ginal tax rate and tax-free allowance [7]. 
L. Chengjian and L. Shuanglin believe 
that a moderately progressive tax scheme 
is preferable since it distorts labour sup-
ply less and is more beneficial for the state. 
It also enables the government to expand 
the tax base that can be taxed at higher 
rates [8]. Their findings are supported by 
J. Davies and M. Hoy, who argue that an 
extremely high tax rate is not necessary 
for alleviating income inequality [9].
P. Doerrenberg et al. believe that bud-
get losses incurred by the deviations from 
standard rules of personal income taxation 
are not pure losses of the state budget but 
should be seen as investment in the coun-
try’s socio-economic policy [10]. G. Iyer et 
al. argue that the government can regulate 
the degree of the flat rate tax’s progressi-
vity by increasing or, on the contrary, re-
ducing the amount of tax exemptions [11]. 
In their study, S. Barrios et al. explore the 
ways of such regulation. Basic tax allow-
ances can in some instances be universal 
or be related only to employment income, 
be granted to all taxpayers or only to low-
income earners, have a fixed amount or a 
sliding scale reducing the tax-free amount 
as the income rises [12].
Contemporary researchers pay much 
attention to tax exemptions, including the 
tax-free allowance, in the light of the ad-
ministrative burden borne by taxpayers. 
M. Keen et al. explain some countries’ 
decision not to introduce a tax-free al-
lowance by their desire to simplify their 
personal income tax administration [13]. 
A. Evans and P. Aligica show the connec-
tion between the advantages of simple tax 
administration and tax evasion [14]. 
E. Luttmer and M. Singhal consider 
the phenomenon of tax morale, which 
they define as nonpecuniary motivations 
for tax compliance, and its potential to re-
duce tax evasion [15]. F. Schneider high-
lights the fact that on the macro-level, 
a heavy tax burden may affect labour 
supply in the shadow economy [16]. Ac-
cording to R. Cerqueti and R. Coppier, the 
shadow economy curbs economic growth 
due to the lack of funds in state budget for 
generating public goods [17]. 
T. Damjanovic and D. Ulph discuss 
the problem of the inefficient use of funds 
in economy due to the tax non-comp- 
liance. The government has to spend more 
on tax control trying to detect taxpayers’ 
evasion schemes instead of using these 
funds more productively [18]. H. Cremer 
et al. emphasize that in the digital age, the 
simplicity of tax administration plays no 
crucial role in the choice of the right de-
sign of personal income tax [19].
Some economists focus on the fair-
ness of the income and connect it to the 
problem of tax evasion. M. Roberts et al. 
show that the public preference for pro-
gressive taxation may be determined not 
by the desire to collect more tax but to 
eliminate the effect of tax minimization 
on the part of wealthy taxpayers [20]. 
Similarly, D. Nichols and W. Wempe in-
terpret the ‘ability to pay’ principle as a 
condition under which the effective tax 
rate should not be lowered as the income 
increases [21].
Some studies approach progres-
sive taxation from the perspective of tax 
burden redistribution. In this case, what 
comes to the forefront is the level of eco-
nomic development of countries. For ex-
ample, A. Paulus and A. Peichl contend 
that the idea to introduce a flat tax scale is 
less popular in societies where the middle 
class is in a strong position [22]. The pre-
ference for tax progressivity, according to 
B. Tarroux, is based on its ability to reduce 
inequality and poverty and improve so-
cial wellbeing [23]. 
V. Tanzi and H. Zee show the con-
nection between the level of economic 
development of countries and efficiency 
of tax administration. They apply this ap-
proach to explain possible differences in 
the tax systems of developed and deve- 
loping countries. In developing coun-
tries, a range of factors such as a large 
share of the informal sector, the limited 
capacity of tax administration, taxpayers’ 
limited ability to keep accounts, the lack 
of reliable tax data, qualified staff and 
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necessary technical equipment for tax 
control can impede the implementation 
of progressive taxation [24].
Another aspect of the research on per-
sonal income taxation is the impact of tax 
design on work motivation. L. Osberg ar-
gues that the progressive income tax has a 
distorting effect on the taxpayer’s optimal 
choice of hours of work and hours of lei-
sure [25]. As S. Raei points out, the higher 
is the elasticity of labour supply, the stron-
ger is taxpayers’ reaction to changes in the 
tax code and vice versa [26]. J. Pántya et 
al. show that the introduction of a pro-
gressive tax scale can lead to a significant 
growth in work performance [27]. E. Saez 
et al. also demonstrate that taxpayers may 
react to certain characteristics of the per-
sonal income tax design by choosing to 
evade taxes or, for example, switching to 
another sphere of activity [28].
A separate group of studies deal with 
the absence of a personal tax-free allo-
wance in the Russian tax system. These 
studies, in their turn, can be divided into 
two groups. 
The first group comprises studies 
dating to the period when there existed 
a standard tax deduction of 400 roubles 
and soon after it was cancelled. These 
studies discuss the tax-free allowance in 
relation to this deduction. N. Solovieva 
argues that the cancellation of this de-
duction aggravates the financial situa-
tion of low-income individuals, which 
contradicts the principle of tax fairness. 
Therefore, she recommends to increase 
the standard tax deduction instead of 
cancelling it [29]. This approach is shared 
by S. Barulin and E. Barulina. Comparing 
the tax deduction with the tax-free allo-
wance, they argue that the optimal solu-
tion would be to significantly increase 
the latter [30]. S. Sulyaeva demonstrates 
that the tax deduction should be replaced 
with a tax-free allowance equal to the 
minimum wage [31]. 
The second group of studies discuss 
the current state of the Russian tax sys-
tem, which does not make exceptions 
for low-income taxpayers. Problems of 
personal income taxation are analyzed 
in connection to the absence of a tax-free 
allowance. T. Davletshin argues that it 
is necessary to introduce a tax-free al-
lowance and apply a zero tax rate for 
incomes below the regional subsistence 
minimum [32]. N. Semenova shows the 
need to apply a tax-free allowance equal 
to the regionally differentiated amount 
[33]. V. Panskov and N. Melnikova see 
the tax-free allowance as an alternative to 
ineffective standard tax deductions [34]. 
M. Kosov and N. Bondarenko consider 
the tax-free allowance as a way to raise 
the income for the poor but warn that this 
measure will reduce tax revenues in the 
short term [35].
N. Malis calculates tax revenue losses 
suffered by the state budget if low-income 
taxpayers are exempted from income taxa-
tion. In her estimates she uses the data on 
the number of low-income earners and 
their average wages, concluding that the 
budget losses will be 2.6 billion roubles per 
month [36]. Her estimates, however, do 
not reflect the actual burden borne by the 
state budget since her calculations do not 
take into account the small business sector 
where millions of taxpayers are employed. 
Neither does she provide any estimates 
of how tax revenue losses are distributed 
among regional budgets.
Thus, in contemporary research li-
terature the personal tax-free allowance 
is usually considered in connection with 
the impact of tax deductions and breaks 
on the progressivity of the personal in-
come tax. The question of personal tax 
allowances is usually discussed together 
with that of tax fairness and is seen from 
the perspective of possibilities and risks 
of tax administration. Both earlier and 
contemporary research on this topic cen-
tres around the idea that the absence of 
a tax-free allowance or its small amount 
reduces progressivity and fairness of the 
personal income tax. Even though there 
is a large body of research on the prob-
lems of personal income taxation in Rus-
sia, the tax-free allowance still remains 
an underexplored topic. Therefore, 
when the recommendations concern-
ing its introduction are given, no quan-
titative estimates of budget losses are 
provided.
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3. Data and methodology
In our research, we are going to model 
the introduction of a personal tax-free al-
lowance in the economic conditions of 
2019 and to evaluate the possible conse-
quences of this measure for the consoli-
dated budget of Russia as well for bud-
gets of regional governments. It is crucial 
to consider the regional aspect because 
the budget system of Russia is based on 
the principles of federalism. In accordance 
with the Russian budget legislation, the 
personal income tax is a source of tax reve-
nues of regional governments. Therefore, 
it is primarily Russian regions that have to 
shoulder the burden of income tax exemp-
tions and reliefs.
For fuller and more accurate results 
we need to be able not only to forecast 
the overall amount of tax revenue losses 
but also to predict the distribution of the 
burden among Russian regions. This will 
provide us with important insights into 
the stability of regional budgets and their 
ability to provide tax support to disad-
vantaged citizens. We will also be able 
to predict the number of regions where 
the introduction of the personal tax-free 
allowance would considerably diminish 
their tax revenues and the number of re-
gions that would lose the least. Therefore, 
in this study we are particularly interested 
in regional statistics. 
We use Rosstat data on the popula-
tion in regions, the share of the working-
age population and the number of poor 
people, on the average and median wa-
ges, and gross regional product (the size 
of regional economy). We also use the 
data of the Federal Tax Service of Russia, 
such as the number of taxpayers, regions’ 
tax revenues, and revenues from the per-
sonal income tax. The data on the amount 
of subsistence minimum were acquired 
from the officially published legal acts of 
the Russian Ministry of Labour and Social 
Protection.
To evaluate the consequences of the 
tax reform in quantitative terms we need 
to specify the parameters of the per-
sonal tax-free allowance. These include 
the following: the maximum tax-exempt 
amount of income; the type of income 
exempt from the personal income tax; 
the perime-ter of beneficiaries entitled to 
a reduction of the tax base. We assume 
that the tax-free allowance should corre-
spond to the standards of living, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, should not 
be extremely low.
In our calculations, the maximum 
amount of a personal tax-free allowance 
corresponds to the subsistence minimum 
for working-age population. This indica-
tor accurately reflects the standards of li-
ving since it comprises the cost of the con-
sumer basket and obligatory payments 
and fees. It reflects the income necessary 
to cover the costs of food and non-food es-
sentials, in other words, the expenditures 
required to stay healthy and maintain ba-
sic life in a society. For the purpose of our 
study, among other types of income, the 
subsistence minimum should reduce the 
employment-related income. Depending 
on who will be the beneficiaries of the tax 
relief, we will identify and analyze budget 
implications according to two scenarios of 
the tax reform.
The first scenario is based on the 
model of the traditional progressive tax 
schedule where the tax-free allowance 
has the form of zero tax rate. Such ap-
proach is the closest to established world 
practices. According to the second sce-
nario, only individuals with an income 
below the subsistence minimum will 
qualify for a tax-free allowance. In this 
case, it will be a targeted tax exemption 
and thus this measure will be able to 
reconcile the social policy goals and the 
needs of the budget system. Therefore, 
the key indicator used to evaluate the 
consequences of the reform is the num-
ber of beneficiaries in each scenario. For 
the zero tax rate scenario, we are going 
to use the data on the number of wage 
earners. For the second scenario, we are 
going to use only the number of low-in-
come earners. 
Our analysis will fall into the follo-
wing three stages. 
At the first stage, we will focus on 
regions’ reliance on the personal income 
tax by using such indicator as the share 
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of this tax in the structure of regional tax 
revenues. For the purpose of our study, 
a region’s reliance on the personal income 
tax will be deemed critical if such share 
accounts for more than 50% of the tax 
revenues. 
At the second stage, we are going to 
estimate tax revenue losses of the con-
solidated budget of Russia and budgets 
of regional governments for the two 
above-described scenarios. We are also 
going to show how budget losses would 
be distributed among the regions, iden-
tifying the most resilient and the most 
vulnerable regions. We will calculate the 
amount and percentage of tax revenue 
losses. The amount per each beneficiary 
will be defined as tax-free amount multi-
plied by the main income tax rate of 13%. 
The percentage is based on the ‘personal 
income tax to tax revenues’ ratio men-
tioned above. To obtain aggregated esti-
mates, we are going to use the data on the 
total number of beneficiaries and their 
distribution across the regions as well as 
the amount of the subsistence minimum 
we specified for each scenario. These es-
timates will then be compared with the 
levels of regions’ reliance on the personal 
income tax and the results will be further 
specified by looking at socio-economic 
conditions in Russian regions. 
At the third stage, we are going to 
systematize our findings concerning re-
gions’ fiscal abilities to compensate for 
their tax revenue losses. The stages of 
evaluation and scenarios of the tax re-
form are shown in Figure 1.
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Regions’ reliance on the personal 
income tax
Many Russian regions strongly de-
pend on the personal income tax for their 
revenues. The share of this tax in the total 
tax revenue of the consolidated budget 
of Russia is about 18% while in regional 
budgets this figure may reach 40%. There 
are, however, significant differences in the 
extent of regions’ reliance on the personal 
income tax: in some of them, the share of 
this tax is considerably below average. 
For example, the Yamal-Nenets Autono-
mous Area has the minimum share of the 
personal income tax in its tax revenues – 
19%. Comparatively small shares – 30% or 
lower – are characteristic of twelve other 
regions, including Khanty-Mansi Autono-
mous Area-Yugra, Krasnoyarsk Territory, 
Nenets Autonomous Area, Republic of 
Tatarstan and Sakhalin Region.
Nevertheless, the majority of regio-
nal governments are much more heavily 
dependent on the personal income tax: in 
60 regions, this tax accounts for 30% to 
50% of tax revenues. In 12 regions out of 
85, the personal income tax is the main 
source of tax revenues, accounting for 
over 50%. The highest share of the per-
sonal income tax is 70% in Chechen Re-
public while in four other regions – Kam-
chatka Territory, Republic of Ingushetia, 
Republic of Tuva and Sevastopol city – it 
is over 60%. In other words, their reli-
















Evaluation of regions’ fiscal 
abilities to compensate for tax 
revenue losses
Evaluation of the tax reform’s 
budget implications 
Evaluation of regions’ reliance 
on the personal income tax
Targeted tax-free allowance
(only for low-wage earners)
Zero personal income tax rate
(for all employees)
Fig. 1. Stages of evaluation and tax reform scenarios 
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A high share of the personal income 
tax does not necessarily imply high wages 
in one or another region. On the contrary, 
most of Russian regions are characterized 
by payments of low wages to employees. 
The lowest income levels are mainly 
feature of the regions that are heavily 
dependent on the personal income tax. 
Moreover, we found that a high share of 
the personal income tax in regional tax 
revenues usually goes together with high 
poverty rates. In the Russian economy, 
this indicator is 12.3% but may vary across 
regions and in some of them exceed 20%, 
for example, in Chechen Republic, Jewish 
Autonomous Region, Karachay-Cherkess 
Republic and Republic of Altay. In Repub-
lic of Ingushetia and Republic of Tuva, 
however, low-income individuals account 
for about a third of the total population. 
Therefore, personal income tax revenue 
collections in such weak, unstable region-
al economies are based on taxes paid by 
low-income taxpayers. Therefore, such re-
gions will be hit harder by the reform than 
their more prosperous counterparts. 
As our analysis has shown, such situa-
tion is not an accident. The share of the 
personal income tax in tax revenues of re-
gional governments can be an indication 
of the degree of the regional economy’s 
sensitivity to income tax exemptions or 
absence thereof, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, the size and state of the regional 
economy. The lar-ger and more developed 
is the economy, the higher is the share of 
the corporate income tax and the lower 
is the share of the personal income tax in 
the total tax revenues. Regions where the 
personal income tax accounts for less than 
30% of their tax revenues tend to have the 
hig-hest GRP. Smaller economies are gene-
rally more reliant on the personal income 
tax. The economic performance of regions 
that are overly reliant on this tax is rather 
poor. A small regional economy is unable 
to generate sufficient economic activity 
to provide tax revenue from a variety of 
taxes and to raise people’s income levels. 
Fewer economic transactions and business 
operations increase the role of the personal 
income tax despite the low average indi-
vidual income. Therefore, the less reliant 
a region is on the personal income tax, the 
more stable is its economy and vice versa, 
if a region is heavily reliant on the personal 
income tax, it is a sign of economic prob-
lems and low living standards.
This conclusion is supported by the 
data provided by the Russian Ministry of 
Finance regarding regions’ dependence 
on federal subsidies. This indicator shows 
how dependent the regions are on federal 
transfers and to what extent regions are ca-
pable of covering its own expenditures. We 
compared the data on the share of the per-
sonal income tax in regional tax revenues 
with this indicator and came to the conclu-
sion that the regions that are overreliant on 
the personal income tax are struggling eco-
nomically, typically less self-sufficient and 
dependent on federal subsidies. 
A small number of regions that are 
less reliant on the personal income tax are 
also more self-sufficient in terms of federal 
transfers (subsidies). These are financially 
independent and economically prospe-
rous regions that tend to rely more on the 
corporate income tax for their revenues. 
This situation is to a great extent deter-
mined by the regional industrial specia-
lization: oil producing regions are usually 
more independent. Despite the low share 
of the personal income tax in their tax re-
venues, they maintain a higher wage level 
(Table 1). Regions with the largest econo-
mies have the lowest poverty rates. For 
example, in Yamal-Nenets Autonomous 
Area the share of poor people does not ex-
ceed 6%; in Republic of Tatarstan, 7%; and 
in Sakhalin Region, 9%.
The personal income level plays an 
important role for the formation of the tax 
base that will be available after personal 
allowances are granted to taxpayers. In 
other words, if there are high wages in 
the region, then it faces less risks of losing 
too much of tax revenues. What matters 
the most is the amount of the tax-free al-
lowance and the number of beneficiaries. 
It should be noted at this point that the 
combination of a very large share of the 
personal income tax in tax revenues and 
high wages is a rare situation in Russian 
regions, with the only exception of Kam-
chatka Territory. 
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Thus, the structure of tax revenues of 
regional governments is determined by 
the socio-economic characteristics of Rus-
sian regions, including the level of wages 
as a tax base. Nevertheless, there are cases 
where a high share of the personal income 
tax in the tax revenues does not correlate 
with the region’s weak economy and the 
generally low level of taxpayers’ income. 
We mean the regions with a concentrated 
tax base that should be considered sepa-
rately. These are primarily the cities of 
federal significance – Moscow and St. Pe-
tersburg – and, besides them, Moscow Re-
gion. Remarkably, in the structure of their 
tax revenues, the personal income tax ac-
counts for 40–50% because these regions 
concentrate over one fourth of employees. 
Moreover, almost three-fourths of em-
ployees with wages over 1 million roubles 
per month work and pay their income tax 
in these three regions. This circumstance 
agrees with the fact that in these regions 
the share of poor people is one of the 
smallest in Russia – only 7% on average. 
Therefore, despite a large share of the per-
sonal income tax in their tax revenues, as 
we are going to show further, the regions 
Table 1
Regions’ reliance on the personal income tax
Regions Personal 
income tax, 
















Regions that are critically dependent on the income tax (>50%)
Chechen Republic 69.5 7.4 20.7 22 501 1.1
Republic of Ingushetia 65.8 11.2 30.5 19 954 0.3
Sevastopol city 64.5 13.4 11.6 29 563 0.4
Republic of Tuva 63.3 16.2 34.7 27 822 0.4
Kamchatka Territory 61.4 14.0 15.0 62 444 1.3
Republic of Crimea 55.6 16.7 17.2 25 901 2.2
Republic of Dagestan 55.5 14.3 14.6 20 015 3.5
Republic of Altay 54.5 21.3 24.2 24 872 0.3
Karachay-Cherkess Republic 53.9 16.3 23.2 20 788 0.4
Pskov Region 53.6 19.8 16.2 23 895 0.9
Republic of North Ossetia-
Alania 53.5 11.7 13.5 21 061 0.7
Jewish Autonomous Region 51.0 15.1 23.9 34 538 0.3
Regions with a more resilient budget (<30%, no federal subsidies)
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous  
Area-Yugra 28.4 41.3 8.9 60 570 24.9
Republic of Tatarstan 28.4 38.6 6.9 31 341 13.8
Sakhalin Region 24.8 62.3 8.5 62 647 6.6
Nenets Autonomous Area 20.1 47.9 9.5 71 303 1.7
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous 
Area 19.4 52.4 5.6 77 542 17.2
Regions with a concentrated tax base
Moscow Region 42.2 26.6 7.3 45 201 23.5
St. Petersburg city 48.4 33.0 6.6 51 248 23.5
Moscow city 46.0 38.2 6.6 66 103 100.0
Russia 17.6 20.2 12.3 34 335 −
Source: author’s calculations
Notes: 1) The economy of Moscow is the largest among Russian regions; for better data compa-
rability we use their GRP in relation to GRP of Moscow; 2) low income refers to amounts being lower 
than subsistence minimum; 3) the data on the median wage are provided by Rosstat for medium-sized 
and large enterprises, and the values of this indicator would be lower if small businesses were also 
taken into account.
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with a concentrated tax base are more re-
silient to tax base fluctuations. That way 
these regions enjoy an advantageous com-
bination of high wages and low poverty 
rates, which leaves more room for a tax 
maneuver and for maintaining the neces-
sary level of the income tax collectability 
when the tax reform comes into force.
4.2. Budget implications according 
to Scenario 1 (zero tax rate)
For all employees, a tax-free allo-
wance means that the traditional progres-
sive scale with the zero tax rate is applied. 
Low-income earners are not singled out 
as a separate category of be-neficiaries. 
An individual’s right to a tax-free allow-
ance does not depend on their income 
level. The subsistence minimum is taken 
as 12,130 roubles. The income below this 
threshold is non-taxable. The tax is levied 
on the income above the subsistence mini-
mum. Progressivity is achieved because 
the share of the non-taxable amount is in-
creased when the income is falling. In this 
case the number of beneficiaries will be 
maximal: in Scenario 1, it would be about 
59 million. Tax expenditures of the Rus-
sian budget system would exceed 1 trillion 
roubles. This sum is equal to receipts from 
certain Russian taxes. The budget losses 
resul-ting from the tax reform in this sce-
nario are comparable with those incurred 
by the cancellation of the regional tax on the 
assets of organizations. The losses caused 
by the cancellation of the personal pro- 
perty tax, transport tax and land tax would 
be more than twice lower.
In this regard the reform would cre-
ate an extremely heavy burden on the 
state financial system. Tax revenues of 
the consolidated budget of Russia would 
be reduced by 5.0%. Taking into consi- 
deration the fact that the personal income 
tax is one of the key sources of revenue 
for regional governments, a more reliable 
indicator appears to be the ratio of their 
budget losses to regional tax revenues. In 
this case regions would lose 11.0% of their 
tax revenues – quite a substantial figure.
No less important is the distribution of 
losses among the regions, especially since 
regions differ considerably in terms of their 
reliance on the personal income tax. In ab-
solute terms, the heaviest pressure will be 
borne by the cities of Moscow and St. Pe-
tersburg and Moscow Region – 256.6 bil-
lion roubles or one fourth of all the budget 
losses. For many other regions, the losses 
would be much lower, especially for those 
whose dependence on the personal income 
tax is critical. For instance, Republic of In-
gushetia would lose 1.1 billion roubles.
This does not mean, however, that 
more prosperous regions are actually fac-
ing a more significant decrease in their 
revenues. The extent of revenue losses is 
determined by the number of taxpayers: 
the more taxpayers a region has, the big-
ger are the losses. Therefore, in absolute 
terms, larger economies will suffer more 
tax revenue losses. The real burden on 
the budget is determined by the share of 
the tax revenues lost due to the reform. 
In this case, the picture looks totally dif-
ferent. For instance, the city of Moscow 
would lose less than 6% of its revenue 
while St. Petersburg city and Moscow 
Region, 10–11%. As for Republic of Ingu-
shetia, according to our forecast, it would 
lose about 28% of its tax revenue, which 
is the largest amount of losses among all 
Russian regions. As Figure 2 illustrates, 
losses of tax revenues of 70 regions would 
exceed 10%, with 47 regions losing from 
10 to 20% of their tax revenues. Losses 
of such scale are likely to pose a serious 






≤5% 5–10% 10–20% > 20%
Fig. 2. Number of regions according 
to the percentage of their tax revenue 
losses (Scenario 1 – zero tax rate)
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Oil-producing regions would lose the 
least: Nenets Autonomous Area, less than 
2%; Sakhalin Region and Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous Area, 2–3%. The tax reve-
nues of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area-
Yugra would drop by about 6%. These are 
the regions where the share of the person-
al income tax does not exceed 30% of the 
total tax revenues.
Interestingly, budget losses tend to 
grow together with the region’s reliance 
on the personal income tax (see Fig. 3). 
The losses exceeding 20% are characte-
ristic of the regions where the personal 
income tax is the main source of tax reve-
nues. Therefore, the majority of Russian 
regions will suffer a 5–20% drop in their 
tax revenues – these are the regions where 
the personal income tax accounts for ap-
proximately 40% of tax revenues. This fi-
gure corresponds to the average figure for 
the whole economy. 
Thus, the less dependent a region is on 
the personal income tax, the easier it will 
bear the burden of various tax breaks and 
tax exemptions. Unsurprisingly, the least 
vulnerable in this respect are the regions 
whose main source of revenues is the cor-
porate income tax. They also enjoy a more 
stable budget and they are also more self-
reliant and independent of federal grants. 
These regions, however, are only just 
a few. Apart from that, tax revenue losses 
still remain quite substantial even for their 
budgets.
One of the reasons behind more ad-
vantaged regions’ resilience to the finan-
cial pressure is the above average wage 
level. Regions with low wages stand a 
small chance of coping with the zero tax 
rate. While the former would still have 
a sufficient tax base, the latter’s tax base 
would be diminished by the tax reform. 
As a result, favourable economic condi-
tions in some regions do not change the 
general situation: the zero tax rate scena-
rio remains undesirable at large.
Our analysis of the tax reform’s im-
plications for regional budgets leads us to 
the conclusion that Scenario 1 goes beyond 
a reform of personal income taxation. To re-
store the level of tax revenues, the govern- 
ment would have to reconsider revenue 
sources both of the federal and regional 
budgets, in other words, create a new fis-
cal system. In the existing economic condi-
tions and taxation model, such task turns 
into an unresolvable conundrum.
4.3. Budget implications according 
to Scenario 2 (targeted tax relief)
Shortcomings of the zero tax rate 
would require the government to change 
the conditions for granting personal tax-
free allowance in order to reduce the 
pressure on the budget system. This can 
be achieved by reducing the number of 
taxpayers entitled to a tax-free amount of 
income. In other words, a more targeted 
























% of tax revenue losses
Fig. 3. Distribution of regions according to the percentage of tax revenue losses  
and reliance on the personal income tax (Scenario 1 – zero tax rate)
Note: PIT – Personal income tax
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people with income below the subsistence 
minimum of their respective regions. In 
this scenario, the individual income level 
is taken into account for tax purposes. If 
a taxpayer’s income is higher than the 
subsistence minimum, the tax base is not 
reduced. Thus, being of little means be-
comes a criterion for entitlement to a per-
sonal tax-free allowance. Therefore, a tax-
free allowance turns into an instrument to 
support low-income earners.
The Federal Tax Service does not pro-
vide any data on the distribution of tax-
payers regarding their earnings. However, 
we have access to the data on the number 
of people living in poverty. It should be no-
ted that poverty is measured in relation to 
per capita income and household income, 
which means that the number of poor 
people may include individuals without 
income of their own (e.g. dependents) or 
those that have a non-taxable income (e.g. 
pension). It is important since a tax-free al-
lowance can be granted only to individuals 
who are taxpayers and have a taxable in-
come. So, using an aggregate poor people 
can create risks of overestimating the tax 
revenue losses, which is why we adjust the 
number of the poor in regions to the share 
of the working-age population. This way 
we can obtain the real number of beneficia-
ries: 10.1 million taxpayers, which is almost 
six times lower than in Scenario 1. There-
fore, the pressure on the budget system is 
supposed to be much smaller. 
In order to measure the tax revenue 
losses as accurately as possible, we should 
know the regional average wages within 
the bounds of non-taxable income brac-
kets (i.e. regionally differentiated tax-free 
amount). The subsistence minimum only 
marks the income threshold for personal 
allowance but the actually used tax-free 
amount would be lower than this thresh-
old. In other words, the losses of regional 
budgets depend on how much of the allo-
wance would be applied by every taxpayer 
depending on income received. There is, 
however, no region-specific information 
on the average income of those workers 
who earn less than the subsistence mini-
mum. For approximate estimates, we are 
going to use the federal average wage 
of a low-income taxpayer (Rosstat data 
on the distribution of the number of wor-
kers according to the wage levels in April 
2019): 9,454.4 roubles.
The forecast revenue losses are 
148.3 billion roubles, which is 7.5 times 
less than the revenue losses incurred by 
the tax reform in the first scenario. Our 
calculations show that the tax revenues of 
the consolidated budget of Russia would 
decrease by 0.7% while regional budgets 
would lose 1.5%. The amount of losses 
depends on the number and share of low-
income taxpayers in regions.
Moscow’s losses would be the lar- 
gest, reaching 7.1 billion roubles. Although 
the share of the poor in this region is quite 
small, this region is densely populated, 
which means that the number of beneficia-
ries will be quite high in comparison with 
other regions. A large share of low-income 
earners combined with a large population 
obviously leads to an increase of regional 
tax revenue losses in absolute terms. Kras-
nodar Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory and 
Rostov Region have over 1 million taxpayers 
each. In addition, all of these regions have 
a significant share of low-income earners. 
Therefore, in each of these regions tax reve-
nue losses would exceed 4 billion roubles. 
Republic of Dagestan is particularly wor-
thy of attention in this respect: in this re-
gion, the number of taxpayers is almost 
20 times smaller than in Moscow city but 
three-fourths of the taxpayers are poor. 
Therefore, the number of beneficiaries in 
Republic of Dagestan is virtually the same 
as in Moscow city (the difference is less 
than two times). These regions together 
with Moscow Region would bear about 
20% of tax revenue los-ses (see Table 2).
Losses are minimized if a region has 
a small number of taxpayers and an insig-
nificant share of beneficiaries. For exam-
ple, in Nenets Autonomous Area there are 
less than 20 thousand wage earners, and 
only 13 % of them would be entitled to 
a personal allowance. In Chukotka Auto-
nomous Area, there are about 40 thousand 
wage earners but only 7% of them are be-
neficiaries. As a result, these regions’ tax 
revenues would decline by not more than 
40 million roubles. 




Distribution of the maximum and minimum amounts of tax revenue losses among 
the regions in Scenario 2
Regions Employees, ths people
Beneficiaries Tax revenue losses
ths, people % of employees mln rbs % of total
Regions with maximum losses
Moscow city 6,969.5 478.4 6.9 7,055.9 4.76
Krasnodar Territory 1,992.5 334.1 16.8 4,927.7 3.32
Moscow Region 3,504.4 320.9 9.2 4,733.5 3.19
Rostov Region 1,422.6 312.3 22.0 4,605.9 3.10
Krasnoyarsk Territory 1,248.2 286.8 23.0 4,230.1 2.85
Republic of Dagestan 366.2 272.4 74.4 4,018.0 2.71
Regions with minimal losses
Sakhalin Region 269.0 23.7 8.8 349.8 0.24
Jewish Autonomous 
Regi on 61.3 21.3 34.8 314.8 0.21
Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous Area 484.9 19.4 4.0 286.8 0.19
Magadan Region 95.9 7.9 8.2 116.2 0.08
Chukotka Autonomous 
Area 38.1 2.7 7.1 40.0 0.03
Nenets Autonomous 
Area 18.1 2.4 13.0 34.8 0.02
Russia 58,904.9 10,057.5 5.9 148,337.2 100
Source: author’s calculations
Analysis of tax revenue losses in 
the ratio to tax revenues has shown that 
the second scenario of the tax reform 
would considerably reduce the budget 
losses of the vast majority of regional go-
vernments. If tax relief is granted only 
to low-income groups, tax revenues of 
70 regions would fall by less than 5%. 
These are primarily the regions where 
the personal income tax accounts for no 
more than a half of their tax revenues. 
Moreover, in 12 regions, tax revenues 
would decrease by less than 1% (see 
Fig. 4). These are Chukotka Autonomous 
Area, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area- 
Yugra, Leningrad Region, Magadan 
Region, Moscow Region, Moscow city, 
Murmansk Region, Nenets Autonomous 
Area, Republic of Tatarstan, Sakhalin Re-
gion, St. Petersburg city and Yamal-Ne-
nets Autonomous Area. In general, these 
are the regions with large economies and 
lower poverty rates. This group includes 
oil producing regions and regions with 
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Fig. 4. Number of regions according 
to the percentage of their tax revenue 
losses (Scenario 2 – tax-free allowance 
only for low-income taxpayers)
In this scenario, a more than 10% 
decrease in tax revenues of regional go-
vernments appears exceptional: such re-
gions perform poorly both in social and 
economic spheres due to a number of 
adverse factors. As a rule, these factors 
include a large share of the poor (higher 
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than the Russian average level), low per 
capita income, lack of business activities 
and resulting overreliance on the per-
sonal income tax. This group comprises 
regions of the North Caucasus, such as 
Chechen Republic, Karachay-Cherkess 
Republic, Republic of Dagestan, Repub-
lic of Ingushetia, and Republic of Tuva 
(Siberian Federal District). We could also 
include in this list Kabardino-Balkarian 
Republic but personal income tax makes 
up there slightly less than 50% of tax 
revenues while listed regions critically 
depend on receipts of this tax. However, 
three-fourths of taxpayers in this region 
are poor, which explains large tax reve-
nue losses. With the exception of Repub-
lic of Ingushetia, tax revenue decline for 
the group would be 10–20%. In Republic 
of Ingushetia, this figure is still close to 
30%, which is the maximum.
As we can see, the scenario of a more 
targeted tax relief facilitates the tax re-
form. However, regional governments’ 
losses are distributed unevenly. Regions 
that are struggling both socially and eco-
nomically would be hit the hardest while 
the fiscal interests of more prosperous re-
gions would be affected much less. Thus, 
there may be a higher risk that the exist-
ing regional disparities would be exacer-
bated. Figure 5 illustrates the connection 
between tax revenue losses and regions’ 
dependence on the personal income tax as 
well as significant regional disparities in 
the light of the tax reform.
The higher is the number of low-in-
come earners in a region, the more this re-
gion will have to spend in order to imple-
ment the tax reform and, as a result, the 
less opportunities it will have to provide 
tax relief to low-income individuals. Ta-
king into account the fact that poor re-
gions are also the most dependent on fede- 
ral funding, increasing financial pressure 
on their budgets will inevitably turn into 
the federal government’s problem.
4.4. Fiscal limitations
We assume that the tax reform in ques-
tion will be budget neutral. The principle 
of budget neutrality means that changes 
in the tax code will not be detrimental to 
state finance and will not go against the 
fiscal interests of regions. In other words, 
the introduction of the personal tax-free al-
lowance should be associated with a shift 
of the tax burden to high incomes in or-
der to compensate for tax revenue losses. 
Our analysis has shown that the govern-
ment aiming at covering tax expenditures 
incurred by the expected reduction of tax 
receipts will have to deal with two major 
limitations. 
Limitation 1 – The absence of middle 
class. According to the OECD metho-
dology, the middle class consists of the 























% of tax revenue losses
Fig. 5. Distribution of regions according to the percentage of tax revenue losses 
and reliance on the personal income tax  
(Scenario 2 – tax-free allowance only for low-income taxpayers)
Note: PIT – Personal income tax
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and 200% of the median national income1. 
The median wage in Russia is 34,335 rou-
bles. Therefore, individuals with income 
25,751–68,670 roubles can be referred to 
as middle class. Such approach, however, 
is purely formal and depends entirely 
on people’s welfare. Therefore, it can be 
said that there is a middle class even if 
the general individual income level is 
low. For taxation, however, what matters 
more is taxpayers’ ability to pay. There-
fore, it should be noted that the interval 
of income specified above corresponds 
to a low ability to pay. The subsistence 
minimum in Russia is about one third of 
the median wage. The average wage of 
47,867 roubles is equal to just four subsis-
tence minimums. 
If we look at the data on the distribu-
tion of per capita income, we will see that 
most Russian regions are low-income. As 
Figure 6 shows, three fourths of the Rus-
sian population have an income below 
the average wage level. In fact, this means 
that Russia has no middle class. Therefore, 
an increase in the tax burden on the main 
part of incomes (below 100 thousand rou-
bles) does not make the personal income 
tax more fair. On the contrary, this mea-
sure will impoverish the population as ad-
ditional tax revenues will be mainly trans-
ferred between poor taxpayers (i.e., from 
1 OECD (2019), Under Pressure: The 
Squeezed Middle Class, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
https://doi.org/10.1787/689afed1-en.
low-income earners to lowest-income 
earners). 
The number of individuals with high 
and highest income is too small to elimi-
nate the negative implications of the tax 
reform. Only 3.3% of taxpayers in Russia 
earn monthly wages above 100 thousand 
roubles. Such wage level cannot be con-
sidered a sign of financial wellbeing since 
it is only twice higher than average. At 
the same time only 0.08% of employees 
have an income above 500 thousand 
roubles a month; 0.02%, over 1 million 
roubles a month. It means that every 
wealthy taxpayer would have to finance 
tax exemption for 200 low-income ear- 
ners in the first case and about 900 of 
them in the second case.
Limitation 2 – Extremely uneven dis-
tribution of the tax base among the re-
gions. The problem of low income goes 
hand in hand with the fact that most 
high-income earners are concentrated in 
only a few of the regions. These are af-
fluent and self-reliant regions with large 
economies, such as the cities of Moscow 
and St. Petersburg and Moscow Region. 
The pressure on these regions’ budgets 
would be minimal. Moreover, they enjoy 
ample opportunities for restoring their 
tax revenues. If there is no viable mecha-
nism for a redistribution of extra tax reve-
nues among regional budgets, the tax re-
form will exacerbate the socio-economic 




























Fig. 6. Distribution of the Russian population according 
to per capita income in 2019, rbs, %
Notes: 1) income figures are given in roubles; 2) monetary income includes the wage. Apart from the 
wage, monetary income includes other sources, both taxable (e.g. earnings from business operations) 
and non-taxable (e.g. pensions, scholarships), as well as social transfers. Labour wages account for 
about 60% of the population’s monetary income.
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Moreover, in Russia some regions 
have no taxpayers with wages above 
1 million a month. These are the regions 
that rely most heavily on federal funding 
such as Chechen Republic, Jewish Au-
tonomous Region, Kabardino-Balkarian 
Republic, Republic of Altay, Republic of 
Ingushetia, Republic of Kalmykia and Re-
public of North Ossetia-Alania. At that, in 
Republic of Altay there are even no tax-
payers with wages above 500 thousand 
roubles. Regions of this group would not 
be able to independently redistribute tax 
revenues from wealthy taxpayers in fa-
vour of low-income taxpayers.
It should also be noted that the fa-
vourable economic situation in a region 
doesn’t guarantee fiscal possibilities to 
cover the regional tax expenditures. This 
is especially true of the economically sta-
ble Nenets Autonomous Area, which does 
not have a large tax base, that is, it has a 
small number of high-income earners. As 
a result, even small tax revenue losses can 
pose a problem for the regional govern-
ment if they cannot be compensated.
Table 3 illustrates the imbalance of 
the tax base distribution across Russian 
regions. Over a half of the employees 
with income above 100 thousand roubles 
a month are employed in just three Rus-
sian regions. Moscow city is a major centre 
of attraction for the tax base. This region 
is the leader in number of highest-income 
taxpayers. Most individuals with monthly 
wages above 500 thousand / 1 million 
roubles pay their income taxes only to 
the budget of Moscow city. Therefore, the 
compensation for tax revenue losses at 
large requires Moscow personal income 
tax receipts to be partly redistributed to 
poorer regions dependent on federal sub-
sidies. 
In most regions, a higher personal 
income tax rate would be all but useless 
as the necessary fiscal effect would not 
be achieved due to the deficiency of high 
salaried income. Therefore, the losses in 
tax revenues would lead to pure losses 
of those regions that are dependent on 
federal funding. The federal government 
would have to increase its subsidies to 
these regions.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we analyzed how the 
introduction of a personal tax-free allo-
wance can influence the Russian budget 
system, in particular the reform’s implica-
tions for the revenues of regional govern-
ments. First, we discussed the extent of re-
gions’ reliance on the personal income tax. 
Our analysis has shown that the majority 
of Russian regions are heavily dependent 
on this tax for their revenues. The share 
of the personal income tax in regional tax 
revenues mainly varies between 30 and 
50%, which can be explained by the lack 
of economic activity and the prevalence 
of the full taxation of low incomes. This 
led us to identify three specific groups 
of regions. The first group comprises the 
regions with struggling economies that 
are critically dependent on the personal 
income tax. The second group, on the con-
trary, includes oil producing regions with 
high wage levels, which are less reliant on 
the personal income tax. The third group 
consists of regions located in the economic 
and political centre of Russia (the cities of 
Table 3
Territorial concentration of high and highest wages
Regions
> 100 000 rbs > 500 000 rbs > 1 000 000 rbs











Moscow city 718,763 36.9 1.220 27,412 56.3 0.047 6 791 60.2 0.012
St. Petersburg city 157,599 8.1 0.268 4,392 9.0 0.007 910 8.1 0.002
Moscow Region 119,848 6.1 0.203 3,801 7.8 0.006 650 5.8 0.001
Other regions 953,000 48.9 1.618 13,097 26.9 0.022 2 935 26.0 0.005
Russia 1,949,209 100 3.309 48,701 100 0.083 11 287 100 0.019
Source: author’s calculations
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